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TO SQUEEZE OR NOT TO SQUEEZE?: A
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine your experience as a passenger on a bus or an airplane.
After checking your luggage to be stowed underneath, you proceed with
your carry-on satchel, perhaps a purse or maybe even a small bag, and
board the bus or plane. You place your carry-on luggage in the overhead
compartment and sit down while other passengers conduct similar
routines. As more and more passengers begin to pack their luggage into
the inadequate space allotted overhead, you notice your bag, along with
the bags of others, being shoved, crammed, and rearranged. This
practice occurs until each passenger has arranged his or her luggage to
satisfaction. If you are traveling on a plane, the flight attendant makes a
final sweep to secure all luggage, which usually consists of yet another
round of rearranging to prevent the shifting of parcels.
Now suppose that, while sitting on a bus waiting for the trip to
commence, a law enforcement officer enters and walks the aisle. As the
officer exits the bus, he squeezes the exterior of various pieces of luggage
stored overhead. One parcel arouses suspicion after a squeeze reveals a
"brick-like" substance. The officer suspects that the bag might contain
contraband.' This situation raises a series of controversial questions.
Should the officer have a right to manipulate the bag in the first place?
Does it matter how hard or softly he squeezed the bag in question?
Would it make a difference if the squeezing incident occurred at a
permanent border checkpoint, or do you cringe at the thought of
someone handling carry-on luggage at all?
If the squeeze and
subsequent search resulted in the discovery of drugs or a firearm, would
you be relieved that the item was located and removed before you
traveled with it on the same bus? Finally, is2 it relevant that the bag is
subject to manipulation by other passengers?
1. Contraband can be defined as "goods unlawful to import or export." Webster's 21st
Century DIctionary 64 (Thomas Nelson, Inc. 1992); see Black's Law Dictionary 322
(Centennial ed., 6th ed., West 1990) (defining contraband as "any property which is
unlawful to produce or possess. Things and objects outlawed and subject to forfeiture and
destruction upon seizure.").
2. This hypothetical is based on the fact pattern in Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000),
in so much as to alert the reader to the difficult questions raised in such situations. Bond
will be examined in subsequent sections throughout this Note.
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The above hypothetical and subsequent questions illustrate the
tension in the application of our Fourth Amendment guarantee to be free
from "unreasonable searches and seizures."3 The complexity of search
and seizure law requires a balancing of our constitutional freedom to be
secure in our "persons, houses, papers, and effects" 4 while accounting
for society's safety interest achieved through law enforcement measures.
The narrow line between an unreasonable search and seizure and an
appropriate law enforcement practice hinges upon whether a person
manifests a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the
search.5 Because every person maintains a different opinion of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is easy to understand
why search and seizure jurisprudence is so complex and controversial.
This Note will first review Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
general. This will be followed by a reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis, which is so crucial to the issue at hand. The state of search
and seizure law in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Bond v. United States6 will be discussed following a historical look at
search and seizure law prior to Bond. The main goal of this Note is to
dissect the majority's opinion by pointing out significant omissions in its
analysis of the Bond facts. The Court's failure to discuss relevant
exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as plain view, plain feel,
border searches, canine sniffs, and airport searches, is both noteworthy
and puzzling because the exceptions imply that a person has a lowered
expectation of privacy in those situations.
Significantly, Bond seemingly created a new "no squeeze" rule
applicable only to law enforcement officials. This result is illogical
because bags on a bus are often manipulated by other passengers,
arguably much more intrusively than by an officer's exterior inspection.
The author will discuss a suggested approach to dealing with searches of
luggage in the bus context and compare it with the Bond Court's
holding. Regardless of whether the reader agrees with the arguments
espoused in this Note, the author hopes that at the very least, the reader
will acknowledge that based on the peculiarities of the case, the Bond
decision was not the proper vehicle by which to expand Fourth
Amendment protection of an individual's luggage from "law enforcement
squeezes."
Moreover, the Court's complete failure to discuss the
implications of its holding in relation to the various exceptions to the
warrant requirement should lead the reader of Bond to question whether
the decision was rightly reasoned.

3.
4.
5.
6.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Id.
See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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BACKGROUND

FourthAmendment Protectionfrom UnreasonableSearches and
Seizures

"The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a uniquely American right that developed as a
result of the colonists' struggles with British power. "7 The Fourth
Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures by stating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
the place to be searched, and
or affirmation, and particularly describing
8
the persons or things to be seized.
A "search" occurs "when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." 9 Moreover, "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person."10 The two types of seizure are the
seizure of property and seizure of a person."
Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable,
subject only to a few established and well-delineated exceptions.12 Some
relevant exceptions to the warrant requirement include plain view
searches, automobile searches, border searches, checkpoint/roadblock
searches, and "stop and frisk" searches.' 3 Although various exceptions

7. Andrew P. Heck, Student Author, The Wheels on the Bus Go 'Round and 'Round:
Addressing the Need to Provide GreaterLatitude to Law Enforcement Officers in the Public
TransportationSetting, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 169, 172-73 (1999) (stating that general searches

were routine in the colonies before the enactment of the Fourth Amendment).
8. U.S. Const. amend. IV. This amendment sets out the rule that a person should be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, along with the methods for obtaining a
warrant See id.
9. People v. Camacho, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232, 245 (Cal. 2000) (citing U.S. v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see Webster's 21st Century Dictionaryat 236 (defining "search"
as a "methodical attempt to find something; hunt").
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. U.S. Const. amend. IV (stating that a warrant must describe with particularity the
person or thing to be seized).
12. Thompson v. La., 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (holding that a warrantless "murder
scene" search of defendant's home was unconstitutional). The Court stated that "[i]n a
long line of cases, this Court has stressed that 'searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
The Thompson Court further
exceptions.'" Id. (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. at 357).
noted that "ItIhis was not a principle freshly coined for the occasion in Katz, but rather
represent[s] this Court's longstanding understanding of the relationship between the two
Clauses of the Fourth Amendment." Thompson, 429 U.S. at 20.
13. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the FourthAmendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1473
(1985). This is merely a sampling of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, some of
which will be used in the analysis of this Note. Bradley noted several other exceptions:
.searches incident to arrest... administrative searches of regulated businesses... exigent
circumstances... search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to
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exist which allow law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless
search, these exceptions are "jealously and narrowly guarded." 14 If a
search is unlawful because necessary elements of the exceptions are not5
satisfied, evidence must be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."1
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained
directly or indirectly in the course of an unlawful search. 16 The purpose
of this exclusionary rule of evidence is to deter police misconduct and
preserve an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 17
B.

The Hallmarkof FourthAmendment Analysis: Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy

In determining whether a person's Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated by a search, courts must first decide if the individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the search.' 8 -Me
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a
'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'"' 9 The first
prong of the test asks, did the person exhibit, by his or her conduct, an
actual subjective expectation of privacy?.
Second, was that person's
expectation one that society recognizes as reasonable? 21 To satisfy the
first prong, efforts to conceal the object of the search can be indicative of
a person's conduct manifesting a subjective expectation of privacy when
22
he or she takes "normal precautions to maintain [his or her] privacy."
However, in terms of examining whether the defendant manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy, the Court appears to distinguish
between an attempt23to conceal something, and the mere "hope that no
one would observe."
The second part of the inquiry into a constitutionally protected

arrest..,

boat boarding for

document

checks...

welfare

searches...

consent

searches... inventory searches... airport searches... school search[es]." Id. at 147374.
14. Thompson, 469 U.S. at 19-20.
15. State v. McBarron, 585 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Kan. 1978).
16. Id. (explaining the doctrine "bars the admissibility in a criminal prosecution of
evidence obtained in the course of unlawful searches and seizures").
17. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984) (discussing the rule's deterrent effect on
police misconduct).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
19. Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360).
20. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
21. Id.; see generally Black's Law Dictionary at 1265 (defining reasonable as "[flair,
proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end
in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by reason.... Not immoderate or
excessive").
22. Rawlings v. Ky., 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
23. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
The Court noted that it was unclear from the
circumstances of the case whether defendant manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy from all observations of his backyard, or simply hoped his indiscretions would not
be discovered. Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy depends upon whether society is
willing to recognize the person's expectation as reasonable.24 The Court
has stated that "[iun pursuing this inquiry, we must keep in mind that
'[tihe test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal
assertedly 'private activity,' but instead 'whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by
the Fourth Amendment.'- 25 The Court has consistently held that an
object exposed by an individual to the plain view of outsiders does not
deserve Fourth Amendment protection since no intention to keep the
object private has been demonstrated.2 6 These two elements of the Katz
inquiry must be satisfied in order to afford a person a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.2
Ill.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON BUSES PRIOR TO BOND v. UNITED STATES

The law governing searches in the public transportation setting
(notably on buses) was divided before Bond.28 Two cases illustrate
contrary applications of Fourth Amendment protections in the bus
setting. 29 These cases reinforce the controversial nature of luggage
searches on buses.3 0 Moreover, the outcome in both cases rested upon
the application of the two-part inquiry into whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 3 1 The issue came down to whether
the passenger's expectation that his or her luggage is constitutionally
protected from
a "squeeze" by a law enforcement official was
32
reasonable.
A.

United States v. McDonald

The first case came out of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In
United States v. McDonald,33 the court found that a police officer's
manipulation of carry-on luggage in the overhead rack of a Greyhound
bus did not constitute a search within the purview of the Fourth

24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
25. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 212. (quoting Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).
26. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
27. Id. at 361.
28. Cf. U.S. v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in person's luggage on a bus and no search occurred); U.S. v.
Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 639 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the officer's search of the luggage
constituted a search).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1324 (noting the question before the court was whether
McDonald had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her luggage); Nicholson, 144 F.3d at
636 (discussing the burden of Nicholson to show a subjective and reasonable expectation
of privacy).
32. Id.
33. 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Amendment and thus failed to invoke Fourth Amendment protection
from an unreasonable search and seizure. 34 As defendant McDonald
and the other passengers disembarked during a layover, three
Indianapolis Police Department officers boarded the bus without a
search warrant with the consent of the bus driver.3 5 The officers walked
the aisle and felt the exteriors of bags stored in the overhead
compartments. 6 The officers then sniffed the air around the bags.3
The squeezing yielded two bags that the officers suspected contained
controlled substances after they felt a packed "brick" substance. 38 The
officers waited until the passengers returned to the bus and inquired as
to the ownership of the bags.3 9 No one acknowledged ownership. 40 After
repeated inquiries about their ownership along with direct denials of
ownership by the defendant, the bus driver allowed the officers to open
the luggage. 4 1 Eleven one-kilogram bricks of cocaine were discovered
inside.4 2 Further investigation led to the arrest of McDonald as the
suspected owner of the luggage.4 3
The court denied McDonald's motion to suppress in which she
asserted that the officers' manipulation of the bags on the overhead rack
constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment."
The
Seventh Circuit ruled that the touching of the bags did not fall within
the auspices of a search under Fourth Amendment criteria.45
In
reaching this decision, the court examined the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy.4 6 Although conceding that a person does possess
a protected privacy interest in personal luggage4 7 the court reasoned that
"the privacy interest of people who are in transit [i.e. on a bus, train, or
airplanel on 'public thoroughfares [is] substantially less than those

34. Id. at 1326-27.
35. Id. at 1322. The officers were on a drug interdiction assignment responding to
concerns about suspected drug activity around the bus depot. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The officer who initially felt the bags containing the drugs had "twenty-two years
of narcotics experience" and "stated that the term 'brick' refers to one kilogram of cocaine
(or other narcotic) packed into a square shape resembling a building brick." Id. at 1323 n.
2.
39. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1323.
40. Id. at 1322-23. Defendant McDonald sat near the bags but denied ownership of
them. Id. at 1323. After the officers opened the bags, another passenger informed the
police that McDonald had carried them onto the bus. Id. The court held that McDonald's
repeated denial of ownership of the bags constituted abandonment. Id. at 1329.
41. Id. at 1323.
42. Id.
43. Id. Other contents in the bags suggested that McDonald was the likely owner
because she was the "only female passenger on the bus who had the physical stature to be
capable of wearing the clothes found within the bags." McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1323.
44. Id. at 1323-24.
45. McDonald, 100 F.3d. at 1327.
46. Id. at 1325.
47. Id. at 1324.
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attached to a fixed dwelling.'" 48 More importantly, McDonald did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bags since it was
unreasonable to believe that others would not handle them.49 In sum,
because McDonald could reasonably foresee that her bags would be
manipulated by others on the bus, the court held that she "knowingly
and voluntarily exposed the exterior of her bags to being physically
touched by other persons. "5 The defendant's lack of a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy removed the luggage from
Fourth Amendment protection.5 '
B.

United States v. Nicholson

The Tenth Circuit reached an opposite decision based upon similar
facts and the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis in United States v. Nicholson. s2 The facts in Nicholson closely
resemble those in McDonald. In Nicholson, the Oklahoma City Police
Department's Drug Interdiction Unit inspected luggage on a Greyhound
bus during its layover.5 3 The officers manipulated luggage stored in both
the overhead racks and the compartment underneath the bus.5 4 The
squeezing and smelling process uncovered a bag containing what felt
like "tightly-wrapped bundles."5 5 As in McDonald, all of the passengers
denied ownership of the bag and the officers opened it to discover
cocaine inside.5 6 The district court held that no violation of the Fourth
48. Id. at 1324-25 (citing U.S. v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1993), cerL denied, 510
U.S. 913 (1993)).
49. Id. at 1325. The court discussed the Sixth Circuit's opinion in a factually similar
case that a privacy "expectation does not extend to the exterior of luggage placed on
overhead racks because such items are 'accessible to others in the normal flow of traffic on
the bus'". Id. (quoting U.S. v. Guzman, 75 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 1996)). The court also
recognized an Eighth Circuit case stating "[passengers have no objective, reasonable
expectation that their baggage will never be moved once placed in the overhead
compartment." Id. (citing U.S. v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1992)).
50. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1326.
51. Id. The court in McDonald also analogized the officers' touching to that of a canine
sniff, which does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1325 n. 7.
Although this is critical to the analysis of this Note, the author prefers to reserve this issue
for later discussion. See infra Section VII.D.
52. 144 F.3d 632.
53. Id. at 634.
54. Id. Although controversial and problematic in itself, the inspection of the luggage
under the bus is beyond the scope of this Note. The facts of Bond, the main focus of the
analysis, only involved luggage stored on the overhead racks inside the bus. Bond, 529
U.S. at 338.
55. Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 635. "Detective Leach testified that '[d]uring the course of
removing the bags from the overhead racks.., they manipulated and smelled .... " Id.
Another detective stated that "he felt hard, 'tightly-wrapped bundles' inside an unidentified
black carry-on bag, which led him to believe the bag might contain illegal drugs." Id.
56. Id. "Detective Leach retrieved the bag from the overhead rack, held it above his
head, and asked if anyone on the bus owned the bag. No one responded." Id. The
detectives then "removed both bags from the bus to inspect their contents. Outside the
bus, the detectives opened both bags. Inside the black carry-on bag, the detectives found
five gray duct-taped bundles each containing approximately one kilogram of cocaine." Id.
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Amendment occurred, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed
reasoning that although the luggage on an overhead rack might be
exposed to some manipulation, the handling by the officers to discover
the cocaine was simply too intrusive.5 7 Therefore, the officers conducted
an unreasonable search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment because
the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
bag. 8 Even if the bag was likely to encounter some manipulation, it was
not reasonable to assume it would be subjected to the degree of probing
that the officers executed in the inspection for contraband.5 9
Thus, it is apparent that a search of luggage on a bus can raise
difficult questions and divergent opinions about what a reasonable
expectation of privacy entails. 60
The previous cases were factually
similar, yet two courts issued totally contrary rulings.
The one
consistency in the opinions, however, was the application of the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis set forth in Katz v. United
6
States.61 Recently, in Bond v. United States,62
the Supreme Court
applied the Katz inquiry to determine whether a passenger on a bus had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his luggage placed in the overhead
compartment. Bond is now the controlling law for searches and seizures
of luggage in a bus setting.6 3
IV.

BOND v. UNITED STATES: A NEW CONSUTIONAL "No SQUEEZE" RULE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT

In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the two-part
privacy expectation analysis and held that the search of a passenger's
luggage in an overhead compartment on a bus violated his Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.64 The
passenger, Steven Dewayne Bond, was traveling on a Greyhound bus
from California to Arkansas.6 5 The bus made a mandatory stop at a

57. Id at 639.
58. Id.
59. Id. "We believe that by handling Defendant's carry-on bag in this manner, Detective
Leach departed from the type of handling a commercial bus passenger would reasonably
expect his baggage to be subjected, and entered the domain protected by the Fourth
Amendment." Id&
60. Cf. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1327 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when
luggage was placed on an overhead rack); Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 638 (finding degree of
manipulation by the officer constituted a search).
61. See McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1324 (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy
requirement for a Fourth Amendment violation); Nicholson, 144 F.3d at 636 (discussing the
reasonable expectation of privacy requirement for a Fourth Amendment violation); Katz,
389 U.S. 347.
62. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
63. See Bond, 529 U.S. 334. This ruling by the Supreme Court supersedes the split in
the lower courts and precludes law enforcement officers from "squeezing" passengers'
luggage on a bus. Id.
64. Id. at 338.
65. Id. at 335.
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As a
permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Texas.
Border Patrol agent exited the bus after checking the immigration status
of the passengers, he squeezed the passengers' luggage stored in the
overhead compartment.6 7 When the agent squeezed Bond's green canvas
6
bag in the compartment directly above, he felt a "brick-like" mass. 8
Bond acknowledged his ownership of the bag and allowed the agent to
Inside the bag the agent discovered a "brick" of
open it. 69
wrapped in duct tape and rolled into a pair of
methamphetamine
70
pants.
Defendant Bond moved to suppress the drug evidence on the basis
that it was obtained in the course of an illegal search. 7' The district
court denied the motion. 72 The appellate court rejected Bond's argument
that the agent had manipulated his bag in a manner that other
passengers on the bus would not have. 73 The court further held that the
search did not fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.7 3 In
holding Bond's reasonable expectation of privacy had been violated, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 74
In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
applied the two-fold Katz test to determine whether Bond maintained a
First, on the issue of
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bag.
whether Bond "by his conduct... exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy; that is whether he ha[d] shown that 'he [sought] to preserve
[something] as private,'" the Court answered in the affirmative.7 6 The
Court found it notable that Bond used an "opaque" bag and placed it
directly above his seat, indicating to the Court that Bond sought to
preserve his privacy. 77 Second, the Court concluded that although a
passenger may likely expect other passengers or bus employees to
inspect his or her bag, he or she does not expect them to handle the bag
Thus, the
in an exploratory manner as did the Border Patrol agent7.

66. Id. The significance of the search occurring at a Border Patrol checkpoint will be
discussed in the section on the border search exception to the warrant requirement. See
infraSection VII.C.
67. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 336 n. 1 (stating that the "[glovemment has not argued here that [Bond's]
consent to Agent Cantu's opening the bag is a basis for admitting the evidence").
70. Id. at 336.
71. Id.
72. Id. Bond was found guilty of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to fifty-seven months in prison. Id.
73. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 338.
76. Id. (quoting Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
77. Id.
78. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 11
434

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:425

manipulation of the bag violated Bond's Fourth Amendment rights.79
In concluding the handling of Bond's luggage by the Border Patrol
officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court focused
primarily on the type of inspection used by the agent in examining the
bag.s ° The Court distinguished between a tactile inspection and a mere
visual inspection in reasoning that a "[pihysically invasive inspection is
simply more intrusive than [a] purely visual inspection." 8'
The
government argued that Bond forfeited his reasonable expectation of
privacy that his luggage would not be manipulated by "exposing his bag
to the public." 82 Yet, the Court reasoned that the manner in which the
agent manipulated the bag was more intrusive than a simple visual
inspection and exceeded the type of handling that another passenger
might undertake.8 3
V.

BOND DISSENTERS: THE PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT

Justices Breyer and Scalia dissented in the Bond case. 84 The
unlikely duo approached the facts of the case in a seemingly more
pragmatic manner than did the majority.
Justice Breyer asked, "Does
a traveler who places a soft-sided bag in the shared overhead
compartment of a bus have a 'reasonable expectation' that strangers will
not push, pull, prod, squeeze, or otherwise manipulate his luggage?"8
"Unlike the majority, I believe that he does not." 86 The dissent sides with
the lower court's decision that it was entirely foreseeable that, in terms
of manipulation by other passengers, a "substantially similar tactile
inspection" by the officer might occur."'
As noted, the majority's rationale was that, notwithstanding the fact
that other passengers would likely handle the defendant's bag, Bond did
not expect it to be subjected to an exploratory search such as the one

79. Id.
80. See id. at 338-39.
81. I& at 337 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18). In Terry, the Court noted that a "careful
[tactile] exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body [is al
serious intrusion... and [is] not to be taken lightly." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18. The Bond
Court does clarify, however, that the bag was not part of the defendant's person, but
argued that carry-on luggage often contains "personal items that, for whatever reason,
[people prefer] to keep close at hand." Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
82. Bond, 529 U.S. at 337. To support this contention, the government cited to Ca. v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that observation of a backyard by police officers as
they flew overhead did not violate defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy) and Fin. v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that observation by helicopter of a greenhouse in the
curtilage of a home did not violate the Fourth Amendment). These cases will be analyzed
in further detail in the plain view section. See infra Section VII.A.
83. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
84. Id. at 339 (Breyer & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 340 (citing the Court of Appeals in Bond, 167 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1999).
rev'd, Bond, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)).
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conducted by the agent.8a Yet, Justice Breyer asked: "How does the
,squeezing'... differ from the treatment that overhead luggage is likely
to receive from strangers in a world of travel that is somewhat less gentle
than it used to be? I think not at al "8 9"
The dissent alluded to the implications of what it termed a new
"constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes'" which would only serve to
further complicate an already difficult area of law."0 Is the effect of the
majority's holding to require a distinction between a hard and gentle
squeeze? Breyer stated that "[tihe comparative likelihood that strangers
will give bags in an overhead compartment a hard squeeze would seem
far greater."9 ' The dissent suggested that although the majority decision
precludes handling of luggage by law enforcement officials, the constant
pushing, prodding, and squeezing by other passengers who are total
strangers will still continue. 92 Therefore,
this decision cannot do much to protect true privacy. Rather, the traveler
who wants to place a bag in a shared overhead bin and yet safeguard its
in a
contents from public touch should plan to pack those contents
93
suitcase with hard sides, irrespective of the Court's decision today.

VI. BOND AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACYTEST
Recall that the Supreme Court in Bond found that a person has a
constitutionally protected right of privacy in his or her luggage on a bus
and that a tactile inspection of a carry-on bag by a law enforcement
official violates a person's Fourth Amendment rights.94 The purpose of
this Note is to dissect the Bond holding and argue this case was not the
proper vehicle to set a precedent that luggage placed in an overhead rack
on a bus is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, it .is
necessary to examine the Katz two-part test in further depth and apply it
to the Bond facts.
The first inquiry is whether Bond manifested an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in his carry-on luggage. 95 Here, the Court looked
at his conduct to determine whether "he [sought] to preserve [something]

88. Id. at 339.
89. Bond, 529 U.S. at 340. "Any person who has traveled on a common carrier knows
that luggage placed in an overhead compartment is always at the mercy of all people who
want to rearrange or move previously placed luggage." Id. at 340 (quoting McDonald, 100
F.3d at 1327).
90. Id. at 342; cf. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 807, 815 (1996) (warning against the creation
of trivial Fourth Amendment distinctions).
91. Bond, 529 U.S. at 341. The dissent also raises the issue of canine sniffs, but that
query will be reserved for a latter section. See infra Section VII.D.
92. 1d at 342.
93. Id. at 343.
94. Id. at 329.
95. Id. at 338.
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as private." 96 Bond attempted to conceal his illegal drugs by wrapping
the methamphetamine in duct tape, rolling it into a pair of pants, and
placing it in a green canvas bag stored above his seat. 97 Because
subjective refers to "existing or originating in one person's mind,"98 it is
difficult to conclusively determine whether Bond truly manifested an
actual subjective expectation of privacy, or merely a "hope that no one
would observe"99 his contraband. Although one cannot read another
person's mind to decide whether Bond merely hoped his drugs would be
kept private or whether he actually maintained a subjective expectation
of privacy in his bag evidenced by his effort at concealment. Despite this
uncertainty, it is feasible to conclude that Bond satisfied the first prong
of the expectation inquiry.
However, even if Bond did manifest a subjective expectation of
privacy in his bag, depicted by his efforts to conceal the contraband, it is
more difficult to say that his subjective expectation was one that society
recognizes as reasonable.10 0 This second element of the Katz test is
based upon an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 101 Although
luggage is clearly an "effect" under the Fourth Amendment, 102 the Court
has held that "it is not objectively reasonable to expect privacy if 'any
member of the public ...

could have' used his senses to detect

'everything that the officers observed.'"0 3 The majority concedes that, by
placing a bag on the overhead rack, a passenger expects others to
handle his or her bag.'°4 Yet, the Court takes issue with the exploratory
manner in which the agent manipulated the bag.10 5 Here, the dissent
has the more practical argument that the probability of strangers
handling the bag in a similar manner is great; therefore, a passenger has
no reasonable expectation of privacy. 106
On the assumption that every passenger has likely witnessed
luggage handled roughly by other passengers at one time or another, it
seems difficult to declare that society would recognize Bond's subjective
expectation of privacy in his bag as reasonable. This also applies in

96. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 740 (1979)).
97. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336.
The Court finds it notable that Bond placed the
methamphetamine in an "opaque bag." Id. at 338. The term "opaque" means "passing no

light; obscure." Webster's 21st Century Dictionaryat 179.
98. Webster's 21st Century Dictionaryat 264.
99. Ciraolo,476 U.S. 207, 212. The Court considered whether defendant, who had been
cultivating marijuana in his fenced-in backyard, manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy if someone perched at a higher level might be able to observe his crop. Id.
100. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
101. Objective refers to "the world outside the mind; concerned with reality, rather than
thought or emotion." Webster's 21st Century Dictionaryat 177.
102. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336 (quoting U.S. v. Place,462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
103. Id at 341. (quoting Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14) (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 338.
105. Id. at 338-39.
106. Id. at 341.
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distinguishing manipulation of the luggage by strangers compared to
that of law enforcement agents. If other passengers handle the bags in a
more intrusive way in their attempt to make room for their own bags, the
allegation that an officer's inspection is more intrusive simply does not
hold its weight. The Court seems to be relying on the purpose of the
0 7
touch by the officers as compared to that of the other passengers.
However, "in determining whether an expectation of privacy is
reasonable, it is the effect not the purpose that matters." °s
In sum, although Bond might be able to satisfy the first prong of
the Katz test by his efforts to conceal the object illustrating his
manifestation of a subjective expectation of privacy,' 0 9 the Court's
holding that society would recognize his expectation as reasonable ll is
not persuasive. Because it was foreseeable that other passengers would
manipulate Bond's bag, quite possibly in a highly intrusive fashion, it
can be argued that he knowingly exposed his bag, along with its
Such an act precludes Fourth
contents therein, to the public.
Amendment protection because Bond no longer maintained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that bag." '1
A final consideration in the analysis of Bond's reasonable
expectation of privacy is the fact that the search of the bag occurred on a
Greyhound bus. This invokes discussion of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement and the diminished expectation of privacy of
those in transit." 2 "The rationale for the automobile exception is twofold: (1) the impracticability of obtaining a search warrant in light of the
inherent mobility of an automobile; and (2) the reduced expectation of
privacy with respect to one's automobile." 113 The lowered expectation of

107. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39 (discussing the assumption that passengers will
manipulate the bag, but not "feel the bag in an exploratory manner" as the agent did).
108. Bond, 529 U.S. at 341 (Breyer & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). "'The
parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant
in determining whether the officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 339 n.
2. Note that "effect" as used here is not the same as an "effect" listed in the Fourth
Amendment,
109. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (discussing petitioner's effort to maintain privacy by using
an opaque bag placed near his seat); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
110. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
111. Cf Riley, 488 U.S at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing requirement that
defendant's expectation of privacy be reasonable).
112. It is important to note that in order to apply the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, "police officers must have probable cause to believe that the automobile
contains contraband." Car-oll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). See Heck, supra n. 7, at
172-73 (explaining that the automobile exception, originating from the Supreme Court
decision in Carrol, can only be conducted without a warrant if supported by probable
cause). However, probable cause to search the Greyhound bus was not an issue in Bond
because the search of the luggage on the bus was conducted at a permanent Border Patrol
checkpoint. Border searches do not require probable cause to conduct a search. This will
be explored in further detail in a latter section. See infra Section VII.C.
113. State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 45 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Cal. v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985)).
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privacy comes from the notion that "[lilt is generally recognized that the
privacy interest of people who are in transit [i.e. on a bus, train, or
airplane] on public thoroughfares [is] substantially less than those that
are attached to a fixed dwelling."1 4 Moreover, automobiles have a public
nature in which luggage can, and is likely to, be manipulated by
members of the general population." s
Recall that when a person
knowingly exposes something to the public, it loses its Fourth
Amendment protections. 116
Applying the automobile exception rationale to the facts in Bond
indicates that because the contraband in defendant's bag was on a bus,
he was not entitled to the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection. 117 A bus is transient in nature, making it practically difficult
to obtain a warrant before a routine stop or layover is complete.
Moreover, as previously discussed, a commercial Greyhound bus is a
very public setting in which various strangers can handle a passenger's
luggage, especially when it is placed in the overhead compartment comingled with other parcels. The majority failed to account for these
circumstances in the Bond analysis, relying primarily on the type of
intrusion to which the bag was subjected." 8 Effective law enforcement
requires that officers have the ability to act, sometimes without a
warrant, 119 in situations where the transient nature of an automobile
0
might preclude obtaining a search warrant in a short amount of time. 12

114. Rei, 984 F.2d at 812 (quoting U.S. v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1988)).
115. CardweU v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
116. Cal. v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
117. ContraBond, 529 U.S. at 335.
118. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
119. See supra n. 112. Again, recall that officers must have probable cause, yet, this is
loosened in border searches, which will be analyzed later. See infra Section VII.C.
120. Aside from a belief that luggage may contain contraband, safety factors also account
for a lowered expectation of privacy of luggage on a bus. See generally McDonald, 100 F.3d
1320. "This diminished privacy interest derives from, among other factors, the myriad
legitimate safety concerns that pertain to those who travel by common carrier. These
concerns stem from. . . the risk inherent in the mode of travel itself.... " Id. at 1325 n. 6
(citing U.S. v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 851 (4th Cir. 1988)). The McDonald Court stated
that:
Given the unfortunate realities of today's world, where law enforcement
authorities must combat a steady influx of illicit drugs, as well as guard against
possible terrorist incidents accomplished with devices ranging from simple
handguns to sophisticated bombs, it is not surprising that over the last few
decades our society has accepted increased security measures (e.g. hand-held
metal detectors used to scan one's torso) at many locations such as airports,
courthouses, hospitals, and even schools. In light of these realities, we agree with
other courts of appeal that have held that the reasonable expectation of privacy
inherent in the contents of luggage is not compromised by a police officer's
physical touching of the exterior of luggage left exposed in the overhead rack of a
bus.
Id. at 1325 (footnote omitted).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND THEIR APPLICATION TO

THE BOND DECISION

Understanding the complexities of search and seizure jurisprudence
requires the realization that, although the general rule espoused in the
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, this
does not mean that it absolutely proscribes all warrantless searches and
seizures. 12 1 Instead, a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement
have evolved to allow officers flexibility in conducting warrantless
searches under certain circumstances. 122 Along with the aforementioned
automobile exception, some of the other exceptions relevant to the
analysis in
this Note include: plain view, plain touch/feel,
border/checkpoint searches, and canine sniffs. 123 This section examines
these exceptions in detail and their role in determining whether a
squeeze of luggage in the overhead bin of a bus violates a passenger's
Fourth Amendment rights.
A.

The Plain View Doctrine:Knowing Exposure to the Public Does not
Afford FourthAmendment Protection

The plain view exception to the warrant requirement allows for a
warrantless seizure of an item in plain view of the officer.'2 To seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant, a police officer must be in a
lawful position to observe the object, and its incriminating character
must be readily apparent. 125 The Bond majority quickly dismissed any
analogy to the plain view doctrine by attempting to distinguish the cases
offered by the government.126
The government cited California v.
Ciraolo127 to support its contention that Bond had forfeited his
reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage.
Ciraolo involved a
visual inspection of the defendant's fenced-in backyard by airplane from
an altitude of 1000 feet.' 28 As the officers flew over the backyard, it was

121. Rather, the Fourth Amendment only prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures,

which is why the expectation of privacy analysis is so vital to determine if a person has a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in the luggage, making a search of it unlawful.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
122. See Bradley, supran. 13 (discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement).
123. See id.
124. Andrew E. Taslitz & Margaret L. Paris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure308 (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1997).
125. Minn. v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
126. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 337 (distinguishing Bond's situation from other plain view
cases involving only visual, not tactile observation).
127. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
128. Id. at 209. Police secured a plane for aerial observation of defendant's backyard
responding to an anonymous tip that defendant was cultivating marijuana. Id. The police
could not observe the plants from ground level because two fences enclosed the yard. Id.
A six-foot tall outer fence and a ten-foot inner perimeter enclosure obscured the view from
ground level. Id.
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readily apparent the defendant was cultivating marijuana."'
The Ciraolo Court applied the Katz two-part analysis to determine if
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard. 3 '
The Court hesitated to rule definitively on the issue of whether he
exhibited an actual and subjective expectation of privacy in the object of
the search.' 3 ' It stated that "[w]hether respondent therefore manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard,
or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would
observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these
circumstances. " 13 2 On one hand, the defendant erected a fence that
could be iriterpreted as an attempt to assert his privacy in the curtilage
of his home. 13 3 Yet, the Court noted that a "10-foot fence might not
shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on
134
the top of a truck or two-level bus."
The Court then applied the second prong to determine whether the
defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable, i.e. whether society
would accept his expectation as reasonable. 135
The Ciraolo Court
declared that "[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual
chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity, [but rather] whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment. " 136
This analysis is crucial
because even though the Court acknowledges that privacy expectations
are greatest at the home, just because the area is
within the curtilage itself does not bar all police observation. The Fourth
Amendment protection... has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes ....
Nor does the mere fact that
an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities
preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point137where he
has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.
The Court found that defendant's expectation that his marijuana
plants were protected from aerial observation was not one that society
would recognize as reasonable.13 8 This has profound implications in the
analysis of the facts in the Bond case. Admittedly, the facts in Bond did
not concern the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 139 The

129. Id. at 209.
130. Id. at 207.
131. I&at211-12.
132. Id.; see supran.21.
133. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 (discussing the ten foot fence around the respondent's
yard).
134. Id. at 211.
135. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
136. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 212 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181-83).
137. Id. at 213.
138. Id. at214.
139. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 335-36 (the contents of petitioner's bag were not immediately
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methamphetamine was not in clear view since it was stashed in an
opaque bag above the passenger's seat. 14a However, much like the
defendant in Ctraoo, Bond did not satisfy the second part of the Katz
inquiry; his subjective expectation of privacy was not one that society
would recognize as legitimate and reasonable. 141 Although Bond took
precautions to conceal his contraband from the public at large, he could
assume that other passengers would manipulate his luggage in various
ways, 142 just as the defendant in Ciraolo could expect that those flying
over his backyard could notice his "garden. " 143 Therefore, because it was
foreseeable that others would handle Bond's bag, he could not claim
Fourth Amendment protection. 144
This brings us again to the Bond Court's main focus on the type of
inspection conducted. It attempted to dismiss any analogy to Ciraolo on
the basis that the inspection was only visual and not tactile. 145 However,
one might wonder how much a fly-over that confirms the cultivation of
marijuana in a backyard differs from a squeeze of the exterior of luggage
that alerts an officer to the presence of contraband. The conclusions to
be drawn from the facts in Bond and Ciraolo seem analogous. In Ciraolo,
other people in airplanes, not just the police, could observe defendant's
marijuana from the same altitude. 14 6
Similarly, in Bond, other
passengers could handle his luggage at will, possibly in a more intrusive
manner than the police.' 47
The Bond Court centered its analysis on distinguishing between
manipulation by strangers, which it conceded that a passenger should
1
reasonably expect to occur, and probing by a law enforcement agent. 4
Yet, in light of the Court's reasoning in Ciraolo that it is irrelevant that

apparent to the officers).
140. Id. at 336.
141. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
142. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
143. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14.
144. Contra Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39 (discussing Bond's expectation that passengers to
move the bag in one way or another).
145. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 337. The Court also distinguished Bond from Fa. v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989). The government offered both Ciraolo and Riley to support its
assertion that Bond had forfeited his reasonable expectation of privacy. Unlike Ctraolo,
Riley was not discussed here in depth because the cases are so factually similar.
146. See Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 209 (discussing officer's observation of the marijuana by
flying above in a private plane).
147. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (discussing Bond's expectation of other passenger's handling
his bags).
148. See id. at 338-39. The Court noted that:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other
passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus
passenger clearly expects that his bag will be handled. He does not expect that
other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner.
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two airplanes might "pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for
different purposes, " 14 9 this new "no squeeze" rule for law enforcement
seems both illogical and unevenly applied. The same rationale would
seem to apply when discussing manipulation of luggage by strangers
and law enforcement personnel. If the defendant in Ciraolo could not
expect protection from a plane flying overhead for the "focused"5 0
purpose of observing his marijuana garden, why can a bus passenger
expect law enforcement officials to take a hands-off approach when other
passengers can manipulate carry-on luggage at will'? 5 '
Since the Court gives great weight to its distinction between a mere
visual inspection as compared to a physical manipulation of luggage (the
physical inspection resulting in an unlawful search if conducted by law
enforcement), 5 2 one must inquire about the degree of difference between
a visual inspection and a simple squeeze of the exterior of luggage.
Either way, a visual or tactile inspection could confirm the existence of
something prohibited by law. This leads to the next point of inquiry the plain feel/plain touch exception to the warrant requirement in which
the incriminating character of the evidence is readily apparent,
especially to an experienced police officer. The Bond Court completely
omitted this exception from its analysis of the case.' 5 3
B.

PlainTouch/PlainFeel:-The Experienced Officer and the "Immediately
Apparent" Issue

Another method for pointing out the flaws in the majority's
reasoning is to review an area of search and seizure jurisprudence the
Court failed to mention in Bond-the plain feel doctrine.' 4
The
Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Dickerson that no categorical ban
exists on the use of the plain touch/plain feel doctrine.1 5 5 The plain feel
doctrine is an analogy to the plain view exception to the warrant

149. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 n. 2. See Riley, 488 U.S. 445. The Riley Court discussed an
anonymous tip of marijuana cultivation resulted in sheriff deputy observing plants in a
greenhouse with its roof and sides partially open from a helicopter at a 400 foot altitude.
Id. at 448. Justice O'Connor stated that in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy,
what mattered was not whether the helicopter was flying where it had a right to be. Id. at
454. Instead, the question was whether it was reasonable for Riley to expect privacy from
overhead observation from the public airspace at an altitude where the public travels
regularly. Id, at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 214 n. 2.
151. This inquiry is especially important because the Court has held that the purpose of
the search is irrelevant. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
152. Cf. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339 (physical manipulation of the bag by police officers was
unreasonable); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (no warrant is required for officers to observe
something readily apparent).
153. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 336-38 (discussing plain view exception without discussing
the plain feel/touch exception).
154. See Minn. v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (giving the rationale for the plain feel
exception).
155. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
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requirement. 5 6 The plain view doctrine permits police to seize an object
without a warrant if they are lawfully in a position to view it, "if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have
a lawful right of access" 57 to it; whereas, the plain touch doctrine "has
an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers
contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful
search."5 8 Therefore, like the plain view doctrine, the plain touch
exception requires that officers be in a lawful position to observe an
object, the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately
apparent from its contour and mass, and the officer must have a lawful
right of access to the object. 5 9 These elements merited analysis in Bond
because the drugs in Bond's carry-on bag could arguable have been
immediately apparent to the agent after the exterior squeeze.
Applying these elements to the Bond situation, it can be argued that
the Border Patrol agent was in a lawful position to feel the
methamphetamine because he had lawfully entered the bus at a
permanent border checkpoint to check the immigration status of the
passengers.16
As will be discussed in the next section, border
checkpoint searches typically do not require a stringent standard of
probable cause.' 6 1 Moreover, at these checkpoints law enforcement
officers are usually concerned about more than just the citizenship
status of the passengers on account of the large influx of drugs coming
over the border, especially from Mexico. 162
The next element, whether the methamphetamine in the bag was
immediately apparent, presents a more controversial question. Some
might argue that because the drugs were wrapped in duct tape, rolled
into a pair of jeans, and then stashed inside a green bag, they were
removed from the purview of the "incriminating character immediately
apparent" element required by Minnesota v. Dickerson. 163 However, one
could contend that an experienced law enforcement official might be able
to ascertain that the "brick-like" substance was contraband, especially if
he or she had felt similar items in the past.'16
The trial court in
Dickersonrecognized this possibility when it stated:
To this Court there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the
156. See id. at 375. 'The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left
in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been
no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.... ." Id.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
1&
See Bond, 529 U.S. at 335.
See infran. 187.
See infran. 189.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1322; see supran. 38.
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officer uses to conclude the material is contraband. An experienced officer
may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell
of burning marijuana in an automobile.... The sense of touch, grounded
in experience and training, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from other
165
senses.
The Court's statement in Dickerson raises the question of what a
simple touch might reveal to an experienced officer. If the sense of touch
combined with both experience and training can be a reliable method of
ascertaining the identity of an object in a frisk or patdown, it can be
argued that a Border Patrol agent with ample experience and training
could identify illegal contraband by squeezing a piece of luggage. A
Border Patrol agent's job entails not only checking the immigration
status of passengers, but also curtailing the flow of illegal drugs into the
country. 16 Thus, an agent who has been trained in the detection of
drugs and has experience in dealing with drug smugglers could surely
have the ability to ascertain an item of contraband. 167 If an officer's sniff
of the air surrounding a defendant, or a "hit"on a bag through a canine
sniff test, can identify the presence of narcotics, how is a squeeze of the
outer portion of luggage by an experienced officer any different?'6
The third element in satisfying the test for the plain feel exception is
similar to the first in that it requires officers to have a lawful right of
access to the object. 16 9 Again, because this search was conducted at a
Border Patrol checkpoint it implicates a loosened requirement of
probable cause and allows officers the right of access to the bus and its
contents therein. 17 0 Thus, the Border Patrol agent had a lawful right of
access to the bus, and arguably the luggage therein, since it was stopped
at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint. Even if the officer was
required to have probable cause before the search could be legal, one
could argue that probable cause existed based upon the suspicion of
drug smuggling at a border area, which outweighed Bond's individual
privacy interest."'
Before turning to the area of border searches, it is helpful to analyze
the degree of the intrusion from the officer's squeeze of the bag in Bond
in the context of the plain feel exception. Recall that the Court in Bond
concluded that the manner of the squeeze by the agent-although
certainly expected by other passengers on the bus-was simply too

165. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 369-70.
166. See U.S. v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. at 539 (discussing custom agents' ability
to search persons coming into the United States).
167. See supra n. 38 (discussing the experience of the officer).
168. The issue of a canine sniff will be discussed in the section on airport searches. See
infra Section VII.D.
169. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
170. See infra n. 189.
171. See infrann. 189, 191.
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intrusive because tactile inspections are much more intrusive than
visual inspections. 172
The Court in Terry v. Ohio'73 discussed the
assertion that an officer's power to make a full search of a person once
probable cause has been established is justified based on the "notion
that a 'stop' and a 'frisk' amount to a mere 'minor inconvenience and
petty indignity' which can properly be imposed upon the citizen in the
interest of effective law enforcement based on a police officer's
suspicion." 174 Contrary to this argument, the Terry Court ultimately
concluded that such a search is not merely a "petty indignity." 175 The
Court explicitly described the process of a body search by a police officer
and decided that it constituted a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong
1 76
resentment... not to be undertaken lightly."
However, the squeeze of a carry-on bag in Bond is distinguishable
from a humiliating body search. The simple squeeze of the outside of
one bag among many to ascertain the contour or mass of an object is not
a terribly traumatic experience to a person who lives in the modem age
of metal detectors and X-ray machines.177 A law enforcement officer's
squeeze of a bag in an overhead compartment does not invoke the image
of the petty indignity of standing in a spread-eagle position against a
wall while being thoroughly inspected by an officer.' 78 Although a
squeeze of one's bag might subject some people with sensitive
dispositions to embarrassment, such lowered expectations of privacy
have become commonplace today with the rising concern for public
safety in the wake of terrorist attacks and the effort to stem the flow of
illegal drugs into the country.179 Thus, a tactile inspection of a bag is
arguably less inconvenient to a person than a body search under the
Terry reasoning. "30
In sum, the Court's complete lack of discussion of the plain feel
doctrine in the Bond case is another factor undermining its analysis of

172. Bond, 529 U.S. at 337.
173. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
174. Id. at 10-11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1964)).
175. Id. at 16-17. "Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall
with his hands raised, is a petty indignity." Id. (quotations omitted).
176. Id. at 17. The Court describes a body search as one in which an officer "'feel[s] with
sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A [thorough] search must be made of
the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the
testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" Id. at 17 n. 13 (quoting Priar &
Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals,45 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)).
177. See supran. 121.
178. See supran. 176.
179. Supran. 121.
180. Supra n. 177. Although a bag does fall within the auspices of an "effect" under the
Fourth Amendment, this author contends that in terms of the degree of intrusion, a tactile
inspection of a bag does not implicate the amount of inconvenience discussed in Terry
relating to a body search. Id.
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Bond's factual circumstances. The plain feel analogy to the plain view
doctrine has implications in the context of an experienced officer with
adequate training and experience to ascertain the presence of
contraband merely through a squeeze of the exterior of a piece of
luggage. The degree of intrusion that might subject a person to a "petty
indignity" begs for a common sense analysis of the nature of the
search.1 8 ' Although luggage is afforded Fourth Amendment protection
as an "effect, "-1 2 a person could reasonably maintain that an all-out body
search is more intrusive and inconvenient than a squeeze of a bag,
especially in light of all the safety precautions today. Furthermore, in
certain contexts, such as border checkpoints, the safety of the public in
preventing the flow of illegal drugs appears to lower a person's privacy
83
interests. 1
C.

Border Checkpoint Searches

The Bond Court failed to discuss the relevance that the search
occurred at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca,
Texas; thereby implicating a lower expectation of privacy.184 In United
States v. Montoya de Hemandez,185 the Court discussed a search
conducted at an international border. 186
It stated that "[s]ince the
founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection
of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this
country. " 18 7 The very fact that a person or thing comes into the United
States is alone sufficient for the person or item to be subjected to a
search. 188
181. .See supra n. 177.
182. See supran. 8 and accompanying text.
183. See infra nn. 188-89 and accompanying text.
184. Bond, 529 U.S. at 335.
185. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
186. Id. at 535-36. Here, the defendant was detained at customs in Los Angeles after a
flight from Bogota, Columbia. Id. at 533. She had $5000.00 in cash in her possession,
but no billfold. Id. Recognizing Bogota as a "source city" for drugs, coupled with
defendant's suspicious behavior, customs officials detained Montoya de Hernandez and
later discovered that she had smuggled drugs in her alimentary canal. Id. Over the next
few days, defendant passed a total of eighty-eight balloons containing 528 grams of
cocaine. Id. at 536.
187. Id. at 537 (citing U.S. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977)). The Court further
expounded that "[import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national
border rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from
domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad comprehensive powers '[to]
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.'" Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619 (quoting U.S. Const.

art. I, § 8).
188. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537. The Court has stated:
Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to protect the Nation by stopping
and examining persons entering this country, the Fourth Amendment's balance
or reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/11

22

Hill: To Squeeze or Not to Squeeze: A Different Perspective
20011

TO SQUEEZE OR NOT TO SQUEEZE

447

Applying the facts of Bond to the border search exception leads the
reader to conclude that Bond manifested an unreasonable expectation
that his bag would not be handled or inspected by a law enforcement
agent. The Border Patrol agent did not need any reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to squeeze the bags on the bus without a warrant
because the squeeze occurred at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint
in Sierra Blanca, Texas.18 9
Although this may not invoke the
international border image in the mind of all readers since Bond boarded
the bus in California and was bound for Arkansas, the fact remains that
the search occurred at a border checkpoint. 90
The Court further stated that the "permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by 'balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.'"'19'
Today's climate of drug
smuggling 192 and proactive tactics to curb such a problem 93 arguably
enhances the legitimate concern of the government for public safety and
outweighs an individual's Fourth Amendment interest that his or her
bag will not be handled at a border checkpoint. The Court discussed the
"longstanding concern for the protection of the integrity of the border"
which is "heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement
caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics. "1 4 It determined that the
"public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in
" 195
deadly drugs for personal profit.
Therefore, the consensus on the broad power afforded to law
enforcement in the context of border searches indicates a propensity to

interior. Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject
to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant ....
Id. at 538. See Black's Law Dictionary at 184 (defining a border search and stating that
"[any person or thing coming into the United States is subject to search by that fact alone,
whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality directed to the particular person or thing
to be searched").
189. See supran. 188.
190. Black's Law Dictionary at 184 ("To qualify as a 'border search,' a search must occur
at the border or at the functional equivalent or the border.").
191. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 588 (1983)).
192. See U.S. v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1325 (discussing the current problem of illegal
drugs).
193. See id. (discussing the necessity of increased security measures).
194. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (quoting U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).
195. MendenhaU, 466 U.S. at 561, (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment). The Justices further opined that:
Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly our
young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated
criminal syndicates.... As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct
may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.
Id. at 561-62.
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allow the Border Patrol agent's inspection of Bond's bag on the bus when
stopped at the permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in Texas. Moreover,
the rationale of protecting the border and elevating the legitimate
interest of the government to combat the flow of drugs in to the country
apparently worked in the Bond situation. Yet, the Court did not even
discuss the relevance of the search occurring at a border checkpoint
when it decided that the squeeze of Bond's bag violated the Fourth
Amendment, 96 thus calling into question the validity of the Court's
analysis.
What can be gleaned from this discussion on border
checkpoints is that, even if a person's carry-on bag in the overhead
compartment of a bus is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection from
a law enforcement squeeze, Bond's under-inclusive analysis disqualifies
it as the proper case to197 set a precedent for a "constitutional
jurisprudence on squeezes."
D.

Sniff and Scan, But Do Not Squeeze?: The Airport SearchIssue

The Court similarly failed to discuss the fact that airline passengers
sacrifice many of their privacy rights by walking through metal
detectors, passing their luggage through X-ray machines, and possibly
even having their luggage subjected to a canine sniff test. 198 The main
justification for such a reduced expectation of privacy is the concern for
public safety. 199 Yet, one ponders why this overriding concern for the
safety of the public at large does not also apply to buses. The Court's
analysis in Bond also leaves some unresolved intellectual and practical
questions. For example, what is the difference between a canine sniff
that "hits" on a bag containing drugs and a squeeze of a bag's exterior
leading an experienced officer to believe that drugs are located inside?
In Bond, the Court did not discuss the relation of its holding to the
airport search context. 20 0 This is particularly troublesome in light of the
fact that an airplane traveler's luggage is frequently exposed to canine
sniffs and X-rays machines. °1 In terms of canine sniffs, the Court held
in United States v. Place that subjection of personal luggage to a "sniff
test" does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.202 The Court reasoned that:

196. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
197. Bond, 529 U.S. at 342 (Breyer & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
198. See supran. 121 (discussing heightened security at airports).
199. See id.
200. See generallyBond, 529 U.S. 334 (no discussion of airport search).
201. Supran. 121.
202. See U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In Place, the defendant was indicted for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after DEA agents subjected his suitcase to a
sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog that hit on the luggage. Id. at 699. The
appellate court reversed after deciding that the sniff test was permissible, but that the
amount of time for which the luggage was detained exceeded the bounds of a reasonable
detention. Id. at 700. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
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A 'canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog.., does not
require opening the luggage... [and] is much less intrusive than a typical
search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the
authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information
obtained is limited.2 °3
If the notion centers on the fact that a sniff does not require
opening a bag, the inquiry then becomes: how different is a canine sniff
from a squeeze of the outside of luggage? The sniff indicates the
potential presence of narcotics without rummaging through the interior
of the bag. Nonetheless, so too can a simple squeeze when conducted by
an experienced and well-trained law enforcement official. The squeeze
could, under the plain feel doctrine, indicate the incriminating character
of the evidence based on its contour or mass.2 °
Past decisions have thought the difference between a sniff and a
squeeze to be minimal. 20 5 "Similar to a canine sniff, a police officer's
touching and feeling of luggage does not require opening the baggage or
inspecting its contents. Thus, the information gleaned from such action
is limited." 20 6 Moreover, because officers must handle the baggage to
make it accessible for the dogs to sniff, some amount of manipulation is
surely allowed.20 7
The main justification for warrantless searches in the airport
context is public safety. Courts have generally applied liberal search
standards in the airport setting. The most obvious example is the use of
electronic scanning machines to ascertain the contents of carry-on
While this is thought to be a search under the Fourth
luggage.
Amendment, courts routinely allow the practice without requiring a
warrant. 2 0 X-ray machine scans are arguably more intrusive than a
simple squeeze because they allow the operator to view all the contents
inside one's luggage. 2 0 9 Furthermore, the scan of a carry-on satchel at
an airport is not based on any particularized suspicion of any one
passenger, but rather it is based on an overall suspicion and an attempt

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 707.
See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
See e.g. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1325 n. 7 (discussing the intrusion of a canine snif).
Id.
Id. The McDonald Court stated:
[We note that police, in order to facilitate a canine sniff, would in all likelihood
have to handle or manipulate baggage to make it accessible for the police dog.
Because the Supreme Court has approved the canine sniff, it follows that the
Court would also likely approve some degree of police handling and manipulation
of personal luggage in order to make the luggage accessible for the police dog.

Id.
208. See Heck, supra n. 7, at 179 (citing U.S. v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.
1972)).
209. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1327.
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to protect the public as a whole. 2 ' ° Located next to the X-ray machine is
often a metal detector. Most people consider passing through such
devices simply a routine part of travel and are not too embarrassed when
coins in their pockets or even certain buttons on their clothing set off the
metal detector alarm.
Searches of luggage in airports are considered reasonable in today's
climate of terrorist bombings and hijackings. The rationale is that
"absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is
able to proceed to the plane undetected is determinative of the
reasonableness of the search. 2 1 1 It has been noted that one basis for
upholding these searches is that people who plan to fly are aware of the
dangers and safety concerns and thus consent to a limited search based
on this awareness.2 12
However, one might argue that whereas a traveler is put on notice
of the restrictions he or she will face when using an airline, the same
does not hold true for a commercial bus. Consequently, the less
stringent safety precautions on buses are perhaps the very reason a
passenger chooses to travel via bus rather than by air since courts have
found that passengers presenting themselves at an airport checkpoint
213
impliedly consent to a search of their luggage.
Thus, it would follow
that a person who travels by bus might not reasonably expect to have
his or her luggage inspected in such a manner. Still, in today's world of
214
metal detectors in schools and courthouses,
everyone acknowledges
that there are some sacrifices individuals must make in order to further
public safety. Buses are every bit as susceptible to terrorist attacks as
planes. A passenger on a bus, whether expecting to undergo a search of
his or her carry-on luggage, knows that luggage placed in the overhead
rack is fair game to any other passenger for rearranging and at times
215
even shoving.
In terms of the reasonable expectation of privacy test,

210. See Heck, supra n. 7, at 180 n. 57 (quoting U.S. v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889, 892 (5th Cir.
1981)) ("Those who actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier.., are
subject to a search based on mere or unsupported suspicion... land that standard] is
equally applicable to a search of a passenger's carryon luggage at the security
checkpoint."). "[Tihe standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate
should be no more stringent than those applied in the border crossing situations." U.S. v.
Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).
211. U.S. v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974). This is perhaps even more
applicable today in the midst of recent terrorist attacks on planes, buses, and buildings.
See id.
212. U.S. v. Dalpiaz,494 F.2d 374, 376 (6th Cir. 1974).
213. See McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1331 n. 5 (1996) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
214. See supra n. 121 (discussing the realities of today's world requiring flexibility for
officers to search luggage in buses without a warrant).
215. McDonald, 100 F.3d at 1327 (quoting the district court). "[Alny person who has
traveled on a common carrier knows that luggage placed in an overhead compartment is
always at the mercy of all people who want to rearrange or move previously placed luggage
in order to squeeze additional luggage into the compartment or remove previously placed
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the passenger's knowledge that his or her bag will be handled seems to
curtail a 6claim that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the
21
luggage.
In sum, the Court's omission of the airport exception to the warrant
requirement in its analysis of Bond is puzzling. Airplane passengers are
routinely subject their luggage to X-ray machines that can "see" inside,
and they also pass through metal detectors that sound if certain objects
are on their person. Moreover, sometimes luggage is exposed to canine
sniffs that "hit"upon it to indicate the presence of narcotics. How is one
to square this with the Court's holding that a squeeze of the exterior of a
bag on a bus is too intrusive? An experienced officer might just as easily
ascertain the presence of drugs through his plain touch of a bag as
would a trained narcotics dog using its sense of smell. Both would not
open the bag to do this, but identify the existence of contraband based
on an exterior examination, albeit through different senses.
Furthermore, the policy behind the airport searches of protecting the
public should be extended to buses because they are surely just as
vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks whether by guns, bombs, or
other means. 217
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MORE LOGICALAPPROACH?

The complexity of search and seizure law might lead one to question
whether there is a logical approach to applying the Fourth Amendment
to situations like luggage searches on a bus. One author has proposed a
"middle ground rule" in such situations.21 3 The middle ground approach
allows greater latitude for law enforcement officials to conduct searches
of luggage on buses in order to protect the safety of the public.2 19 The
approach highlights the need for relaxed proscriptions against searches
in airports due to the sheer number of lives that could be lost in a
terrorist attack, while still accounting for the safety risks in the other
modes of transportation. 220 The proposed middle ground rule simplifies

luggage." Id.
216. See supran. 89 and accompanying text.
217. Although the issue in Bond centered on narcotics, the underlying principle of
protecting the interest of the public is still applicable.
218. Heck, supra n. 7, at 193-94. Heck's middle ground rule would be a compromise
between the tests for searches in airports and searches of automobiles. The middle ground
rule would apply to "buses, trains, and other similar modes of transportation." Id
219. See id. at 194 (discussing the differences in the relaxed and strict standards
applicable to airports and buses, respectively). Heck notes that "[aIlthough the crime that
occurs on buses, trains, and the like invariably receives significantly less attention than
that which occurs on airplanes, the threat posed by such crime is very real nonetheless."
Id.
220. See id. at 195 (arguing that the admissibility of searches on buses should not be
relaxed to the point of airport searches, but neither should it be as restricted as an
automobile search because buses do invoke a public setting in which more people could be
harmed).
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the method for determining if a search occurred by allowing courts to
'spend [their] resources attempting to determine if the officers had a
generalized suspicion sufficient to allow the search"221 instead of
agonizing over whether a search even occurred. The middle ground
approach is also touted as a significant deterrent. 2 Finally, the need to
inquire into a person's reasonable expectation of privacy would be
eliminated in the application of a middle ground rule.223
Although the middle ground approach claims to eliminate the need
for an inquiry into a person's reasonable expectation of privacy on the
premise that it is too difficult to quantify,22 4 the reasonable expectation
of privacy test still retains its usefulness in applying Fourth Amendment
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. The reasonable
expectation of privacy inquiry is the most flexible and enduring test we
can hope to have in the complex maze of search and seizure law. Since
it was first expounded in Katz v. United States, 225 it has allowed the
courts to view a person's expectation of privacy from an ultimately
objective frame of analysis. Unfortunately, as with all tests, the two-part
inquiry is subject to error from time to time. Such flaws occur when a
court misapplies the standard and does not use common sense and logic
in its application.2 26
221. Id. at 198. The author also argues that a middle ground approach would achieve
uniformity throughout the circuits, but the Bond ruling (which came after Heck's article)
has expounded a uniform guideline in its ruling that an officer's squeeze of a bus
passenger's luggage violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. See supra n. 49 and
accompanying text.
222. See Heck, supra n. 7, at 198 ("As it becomes known that law enforcement officials
are able to conduct such searches, criminals will likely be more reluctant to carry on their
illicit activities on public transportation due to the threat of discovery."). Heck maintains
that a deterrent effect can be found in San Francisco where "overall crime on San
Francisco's transit system declined by one-third over the past two years, with assaults
plunging 60-percent during the same period." Id. at 198 n. 145.
223. Id. at 198. "Specifically, courts could abandon the need to examine the passengers'
reasonable expectation of privacy and focus on whether the officers conducting the search
had the requisite generalized suspicion of the bus or train, or group of buses or trains." Id.
224. Id. at 198 n. 146. Heck cites a critique of the reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
An actual subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement
of what [Katz] held or in a theory of what the [Fjourth [A]mendment protects. It
can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to
[F]ourth [A]mendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish each
person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing... that...
George Orweli's 1984 police state was being [instituted] ... and that we were all
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Id. at 190 n. 117 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The FourthAmendment,
58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1974)).
225. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
226. This author argues that the Supreme Court in Bond misapplied the two-part
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry because the expectation that others would not
handle a person's carry-on parcel on a bus is not one that society would recognize as
reasonable. Contra Bond, 529 U.S. 334. The Bond Court acknowledged that other
passengers might manipulate the luggage, but a person manifests a reasonable expectation
that a law enforcement official would not handle the bag. Id. at 338. This author contends
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2 27
failed to correctly apply the
The Court in Bond v. United States
consistent with logic
a
manner
reasonable expectation of privacy test in
The greatest
and our nation's evolving safety and drug concerns.
advantage of our Constitution is that it is a "living" constitution that has
adapted to our evolving morals and crises over the last two hundred plus
years. 228 In keeping with this tradition, the courts must exercise great
care to allow our laws to adapt to the times. As mentioned in the airport
and drug sections of this Note, in our age of terrorist attacks and
rampant drug smuggling, law enforcement officials must be afforded
some level of ability to deal with the problems and protect the interest of
society as a whole.22 9
Even if a person does manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in
his or her luggage stowed overhead in a crowed bus compartment, and
even if society would recognize such an expectation as reasonable, Bond
was not the proper case to set a precedent effectively tying the hands of
law enforcement officials in a bus setting. The bottom line of Bond is
that even if a dozen other strangers can reasonably be expected to
smash, shove, and manipulate a person's carry-on luggage on a bus, a
law enforcement official absolutely cannot even feel the exterior of the
baggage.2 0 This new "no squeeze" rule for law enforcement officers is
illogical and impractical.
Perhaps even more puzzling is the Court's complete failure to
discuss relevant exceptions to the warrant requirement, which were
arguably implicated in the facts of Bond 3 ' An analogy to the plain view
doctrine was invoked because anything a person knowingly exposes to
the public is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 2 3 2 However,
the Court immediately dismissed the analogy. Similarly, the plain feel

that the various exceptions to the warrant requirement (along with common sense and
experience) dilute this argument. The many peculiarities in the facts of Bond that invoke
various exceptions to the warrant requirement chip away at the notion that the passenger
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy that his carry-on luggage would not be
handled by law enforcement personnel on the bus.
227. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
228. In viewing the United States Constitution as a "living constitution," the eloquent
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes are applicable:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century and cost their successors much
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. [Cases] must be considered
in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.
Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
229. See supran. 121.
230. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
231. See supran. 13.
232. See supran. 89.
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doctrine was a relevant, but omitted, inquiry to the Court's analysis
since an experienced officer might be able to immediately ascertain the
incriminating character of a "brick-like" mass in a bag.2 3 Automobile
searches at border checkpoints, such as the checkpoint where the Bond
search occurred, do not require probable cause and the expectation of
privacy is diminished. 234 Finally, airport searches are more intrusive
than a simple squeeze of the exterior of a bag because those searches
involve X-ray machines, metal detectors, and occasional canine sniffs.23
In light of the Court's improper use of Bond as the vehicle to
enhance Fourth Amendment protection of passengers' luggage on a bus
from law enforcement squeezes, arguably more logical and well-reasoned
approaches to this issue can be found in cases like United States v.
McDonald.2 36 The McDonald Court was more practical in declaring that
because a person could expect that other passengers on a bus would
manipulate his or her luggage, he or she did not manifest a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the luggage. Therefore, no search occurs
because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the luggage. 7
Similarly, the dissenting justices in Bond were more practical in
accounting for the realities of modem travel and criticizing the
nonsensical distinction between a stranger's exploratory handling of a
bag as compared to a mere outer squeeze of the same bag by a law
enforcement officer.23 8
In conclusion, Bond fails to hold its weight as the proper vehicle for
setting a precedent against law enforcement exterior squeezes of luggage
on a bus. The many unique factors in Bond invoke various exceptions to
the warrant requirement which the Court did not properly analyze.
Moreover, the Court's illogical application of the reasonable application
of privacy test dooms the case to placement in a category of poorly
reasoned decisions on the part of the Supreme Court. The Court must
take into account the realities of travel and society's ever-increasing
need for prevention from terrorist attacks and drug smuggling. Bus
passengers deserve as much protection as airline passengers have been
given. Admittedly, no one enjoys having his or her luggage manipulated,
but if a stranger can shove and manipulate your bag, is it really so
intrusive for a law enforcement official to conduct a mere exterior
squeeze of the bag? The concept of a living constitution calls for

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra Section VII.B.
See supra nn. 188-89 and accompanying text.
See supra nn. 208, 211 and accompanying text.
100 F.3d 1320 (1996); see suprann. 49, 51 and accompanying text.
See id. at 1325.
Bond. 529 U.S. at 340; see supran. 90.
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flexibility for law enforcement officers to implement the law and protect
society as a whole, even in the bus setting. In the end, Bond's holding
only serves to complicate an already perplexing area of constitutional
law.
Laura Hi!
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